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Michael Hart
In this issue...
Divergent regulations and border regimes in Canada and the US are
threatening the integrated, cross-border structure of the Canadian auto
industry. It is time for common regulations governing safety, fuel
consumption and environmental protection, and faster, more efficient
border clearances.
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THE BORDER PAPERSThe automotive industry has benefitted enormously from the 1964 Canada-US
decision to pursue trade and industrial policies that gave it the incentive to integrate.
Integration, in turn, has allowed suppliers, workers and customers alike to reap the
benefits of specialization and economies of scale. Regulatory developments in the
two countries, on the other hand, while generally consistent in philosophy and
approach, have not kept up with the reality of integrated production. When
combined with the thickening of the border after 9/11, the result has been to re-
introduce barriers to full Canadian participation in the industry. The situation is not
sustainable.
The author examines a critical aspect of government policy that requires greater
Canada-US cooperation: the need for common regulations governing safety, fuel
consumption and environmental protection.  More broadly, he assesses how today’s
differences in regulatory and border administration regimes undermine the ability
of Canadian autoworkers and suppliers to remain part of a fully integrated North
American manufacturing base. He offers potential solutions to reverse the two
governments’ divergent approaches, including greater investment in infrastructure
and technology, more reliance on risk assessments and random inspections, and
better pre-clearance programs for goods, vehicles and people.
The automotive industry in North America faces tough challenges, from product
development to financial woes. Both the US and Canadian governments have
responded to the pleas from the industry to help it through its current difficulties.
One way to do that is to reduce the cost of regulatory divergence, a reform that will
impose no burden on taxpayers. 
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I
n 1964, Prime Minister Lester
Pearson and President Lyndon
Johnson authorized negotiation of
the Canada-US Automotive Products
Agreement – the Auto Pact. They
agreed that it made little sense for their
two governments to fight a trade war
over automotive policy and stand in the
way of the integration of the North
American automotive industry.1 It
turned out to have been a remarkably
prescient decision. 
Over the subsequent four decades, integrated
production has proven a boon to industry, workers
and consumers alike on both sides of the border. 
Today, the industry again faces major challenges,
from product development and new environmental
requirements to changing demand and increasing
overseas competition, including the prospect of new
rivals from India and China. Governments are
providing major infusions of cash to help the
industry face a barrage of economic problems. In
these circumstances, there is concern that the
industry is in danger of fragmenting once again, this
time because the two governments are insufficiently
sensitive to its integrated, cross-border structure. 
This Commentary2 focuses on one critical aspect
of government policy that requires greater Canada-
US cooperation: the need for common regulations
governing safety, fuel consumption and environ-
mental protection. It examines how today’s
differences in regulatory and border administration
regimes undermine the ability of Canadian
autoworkers and suppliers to remain part of a fully
integrated North American manufacturing base.
And it offers potential solutions to reverse the two
governments’ divergent approaches, especially
since 9/11. 
Enhanced regulatory convergence and a more
open Canada-US border are objectives widely shared
among all North American industries. The auto
industry, however, provides an excellent test case to
demonstrate the feasibility of efforts to meet these
goals. It is the most integrated cross-border industry,
with a record of nearly five decades of working with
the two governments to meet shared public policy
objectives. 
Modern, just-in-time production techniques
pioneered by the industry are critically dependent on
efficient transportation and communications
infrastructure and a well-functioning border regime.
Reducing government-mandated barriers to the
further integration of the industry should also pay
tangible dividends in strengthening the industry to
meet global competition and in meeting shared
safety, environmental and fuel-economy goals. 
The Commentary begins with an assessment of the
Auto Pact and its impact on the evolution of the
industry. It next describes the development of the
principal regulatory regimes in the United States and
Canada and the reasons for the differences that have
emerged between the two countries. It then
considers the limits of global coordination
mechanisms, the basis that already exists for cross-
border cooperation and the extent to which
Canadian and US approaches to safety, fuel
economy and pollution abatement are similar in
objectives and desired outcomes, but slightly
different in detail. 
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1 In 1964, following Canada's decision to introduce an enhanced  duty remission scheme to promote more export-oriented production, the US
Treasury Department was considering a request from Modine Industries in Racine, Wisconsin for countervailing duties on any exports
benefiting from this program. The odds indicated that the request would be granted and would lead to other industry complaints.
2 The Commentary builds on an earlier C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, Hart (2006). It focuses on the bilateral dimensions of the issues. The
increasing role of Mexico in the assembly of cars and the production of parts that form part of North American supply chains suggests that
some of the recommended bilateral reforms here will need eventually to include Mexico as well. Experience since the negotiation of the
NAFTA, however, argues for a two-speed approach. Addressing regulatory differences and border administration issues with Mexico will prove
much more productive once Canada and the United States have resolved the issues identified in this Commentary. Pursuing such issues on a
trilateral basis from the outset is likely to be much slower and less productive than first pursuing them bilaterally. Finally, as topical as
discussion of the industry's financial woes may be, this paper addresses a longer standing problem that illustrates the extent to which ministers,
legislators and officials on both sides of the border fail to take sufficient account of the industry's cross-border, integrated structure in
considering regulatory and other matters, including financial assistance. I leave to others the discussion of the pros and cons of bailouts, new
regulatory demands and their impact on the industry's future. | 2 Commentary 286
In conclusion, this Commentary recommends that
Ottawa and Washington eliminate remaining
regulatory differences and introduce mandatory
coordination mechanisms to ensure that new
differences are not introduced into the system. The
objective should be to implement a coherent
regulatory regime that allows manufacturers to
produce and certify vehicles to a single North
American standard. It further proposes that the two
governments complement their regulatory
convergence efforts by pursuing an ambitious joint
program aimed at making the border both less
intrusive and more secure. 
The Lessons of the Auto Pact
Prior to the negotiation of the Auto Pact, the
Canadian and US auto industries developed in
parallel, producing largely similar products for
domestic consumption in each market. The
consolidation of the industry in the 1920s and
1930s resulted in the same companies dominating
vehicle assembly and parts production in both
countries. Even the principal union – the United
Auto Workers – represented workers on both sides
of the border.3 In effect, Canadian production
developed as a branch-plant of its US owners, but
without the benefit of operating as part of an
integrated industry. 
The small size of the Canadian market and the
increasing capital intensity of the industry, however,
exposed Canadians to three inevitable results: less
choice, higher prices and lower wages. Tariffs of 25
percent on cars and 17.5 percent on parts reserved
the Canadian market for Canadian workers and
producers, but at a high cost. The much larger US
market allowed assemblers, parts manufacturers,
workers and consumers to gain the full benefits of
specialization and economies of scale. By the mid-
1960s, on the other hand, Canadians were paying
up to twice as much for similar cars, while Canadian
auto workers’ wages were as much as 30 percent
lower than their US counterparts (Hart 2002, 240-
247; and Anastakis 2005).
From the late 1950s through the early 1960s,
Canadian officials tried to find solutions to this
conundrum, largely by focusing on export
incentives to increase the size of the market. None
succeeded, but some raised the ire of US
government and industry officials, thereby exposing
the Canadian industry to potential retaliation under
American trade rules. 
The key to resolving this dilemma was to
recognize market and industrial reality and allow the
Canadian and US industries to become fully
integrated in a single North American industry. To
that end, the Auto Pact allowed qualified firms
producing vehicles and parts in Canada to freely
import parts and vehicles from anywhere in the
world. It also allowed such firms to export parts and
vehicles produced in Canada to the United States
without facing tariff or other protective measures.
Canadian plants could thus become much more
specialized and gain the same economies of scale as
their US counterparts. 
In less than a decade, choice expanded, the wage
gap narrowed and prices converged. It is difficult to
point to any other Canadian or US trade or
industrial policy decision that had such immediate
and long-term positive results for all involved. As an
integrated industry, the North American industry,
now including Mexico, produces about 15.9 million
motor vehicles annually for a market that absorbs
about 19.9 million vehicles. Canadian plants
assembled 2.6 million vehicles in 2006, while the
Canadian market added up to 1.7 million vehicles
(Industry Canada 2007b). 
Economies of scale have had an enormous
positive economic impact in Canada, providing
consumers with access to a high-quality, competitive
and diverse automobile product lineup and
employing upwards of 150,000 people in their
manufacture.
Today, the industry faces new, but equally
challenging issues. The solution, however, remains
the same: the two federal governments need to work
together to facilitate further and deeper cross-border
integration. The barriers to that integration today
are not tariffs, subsidies and other industrial policy
measures, but regulatory differences and border
administration. 
Fifty years ago, economic goals and regulations
prevented the two industries from reaping the full
C.D. Howe Institute
3 Canadian autoworkers proved less enthusiastic about integration and formed their own union, the Canadian Auto Workers, in 1984.Commentary 286 | 3
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benefits of specialization and scale. Today, small
differences in regulations and programs to ensure
border security, vehicle safety, energy efficiency and
environmental stewardship are again carving the
North American industry into two. They are
threatening the ability of firms operating on the
Canadian side of the border to remain part of cross-
border supply and distribution chains. 
Evolution of the Industry Subsequent 
to the Auto Pact
Looking back half a century, the North American
automotive sector consisted of the major US-
based assemblers and a range of in-house,
affiliated and independent parts suppliers. All of
the major firms produced passenger vehicles and
light trucks designed specifically for the Canadian
and US markets. Their customers beyond North
America were typically served from overseas
operations, while foreign car producers, at best,
served niche markets in North America. 
Today, North American consumers are served
by a much wider range of firms – foreign and
domestic – relying on both Canadian and US
assembly facilities as well as imports. The Big
Three US-based firms – GM, Ford and Chrysler –
rely on their Canadian and US assembly facilities
to meet most domestic demand. They import
both parts and vehicles from overseas suppliers
and facilities to fill out their lines and meet
competition. Both US-based and foreign-based
firms increasingly source parts from independent
and affiliated suppliers on both sides of the
border. Cross-ownership and joint research and
production arrangements add to the complexity of
the industry’s structure. 
Five major brands assemble cars in Canada: the
Big Three plus Toyota and Honda. As well, GM
and Suzuki operate a joint facility in Ingersoll,
Ontario. The same five companies, together with
Nissan, Mitsubishi, Subaru, Mazda (joint venture
with Ford), BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Hyundai/Kia
and Volkswagen, maintain facilities in the United
States. These major assemblers, joined by a dozen
or so others, also maintain factories throughout
Europe, Asia and Latin America and have
integrated their global operations in order to serve
customers around the world as efficiently as
possible. 
These large multinational firms are the public
face of the industry. In addition, more than
100,000 firms – about 4,000 located in Canada,
including major operations such as Magna –
supply the assemblers with parts and components.
These suppliers, in turn, are essential customers of
steel, aluminum, glass, rubber, plastic and other
purveyors of the raw materials needed to
manufacture parts and components. 
The major name-brand automotive firms are
contributing a decreasing share of the value of
finished vehicles. Many of them have spun off
former in-house suppliers and rely on competition
among independent suppliers for the
approximately 8,000 parts, components and sub-
assemblies that go into a finished vehicle. While
long-term relationships remain a feature of the
industry, particularly for Asian-based firms,
competitive pressures ensure that parts suppliers
keep a close eye on costs. 
Downstream from the producers of finished
vehicles, a vast network of dealerships, fuel refiners
and distributors, service and repair facilities,
specialty modifiers along with after-market parts
makers and distributors all depend on a well-
functioning and regulated automotive industry. It
is not a stretch to conclude that the automotive
industry produces one of the most technologically
sophisticated products of the 21st century. Its
products are the result of a highly complex
research, development, design, engineering,
manufacturing, distribution and services process.
It is also one of the most regulated industries in
the world. Innovation in design and performance
– and awareness of increasingly demanding
regulatory requirements – permeates all levels of
the industry. 
Global automotive capacity currently outstrips
global demand, leading to fierce competition in all
sectors and at all price points. Mature markets in
Europe, North America and Japan offer limited
prospects for growth, but emerging markets,
particularly in Asia, have spurred major increases| 4 Commentary 286
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in capacity geared to serving these markets.4 Total
global auto production in 2006 reached 68.5
million passenger vehicles, an increase of 18.5
million from a decade earlier. While the absolute
numbers of finished vehicles produced in Canada
that year increased to 2,571,000 from 2,397,000 a
decade earlier, Canada’s share of global production
has nevertheless declined from 4.8 percent to 3.7
percent over the past decade (Industry Canada
2007b). 
The globalization of the industry is more than a
matter of ownership and a much wider customer
base. Just-in-time production techniques and
sophisticated supply chains have resulted in the
development of intricate production patterns and
inter- and intra-firm relationships.5 Crucial to this
development has been the ability to move parts and
finished products across borders unimpeded by the
trade barriers of the past. 
Customs unions and free-trade agreements have
eliminated traditional customs barriers among many
geographically proximate producers. Even the
remaining most-favoured-nation tariffs on parts and
vehicles are now low enough in OECD countries –
e.g., 6.1 percent to 8.5 percent in Canada, 2.5
percent in the United States, free in Japan and 10
percent in the EU – that they are now less critical to
location decisions and less likely to act as barriers to
the integration of production. 
The Canadian industry – both assemblers and
parts manufacturers – represents a subset of this
global industry and, like other smaller national
industries, is vulnerable to global competitive
pressures. Canada is a significant importer and
exporter of parts and vehicles. Most of that trade is
between the United States and Canada as a result of
the industry’s post-Auto Pact integration, adding up
to $134 billion in two-way trade in 2006, nearly a
quarter of the value of total two-way merchandise
trade between the two nations. 
In the same year, Canadian manufacturers
exported about $2 billion a year in automotive
products beyond the United States, and Canadian
firms and distributors imported $21 billion in parts
and finished vehicles from non-US suppliers
(Industry Canada 2007b). The ability of the major
firms to maintain assembly facilities in Canada, and
thus maintain the viability of the many parts
suppliers that feed their operations, is vitally
dependent on the regulatory and policy framework
within which the industry operates.
Regulation of the Automotive Sector
Increased automotive mobility has sparked various
social concerns ranging from land use for
transportation infrastructure and depletion of finite
energy resources to environmental and safety
impacts. Governments have responded to these
concerns in different ways: limiting roadway
construction, investing in public transport systems,
implementing vehicle inspection and maintenance
programs and introducing fuel taxes and toll roads.
These differences can have important impacts on
how industry responds. Most of these
developments, however, are relatively recent. Few
existed at the time the Auto Pact was negotiated.
The 1964 negotiation of the Auto Pact fitted in
well with prevailing regulatory philosophy: the state
should use its power to effect socially and/or
politically desirable economic outcomes. The
negotiation of international trade agreements,
however, steadily whittled away at the trade and
industrial policy instruments available to
governments to direct or even influence economic
outcomes. 
While not often considered as such, trade
agreements operate similarly to disarmament
agreements: governments enter into commitments
to reduce and eliminate barriers to international
trade, such as tariffs and quotas, and to circumscribe
the use of others such as subsidies, government
procurement preferences and product standards.
4 According to Fine et al., p. 74: "A massive increase in automobile usage is also occurring in developing countries, where mobility is absolutely
essential to the development process. … Developed countries typically have 300 to 600 cars per 1,000 population, but many large developing
countries have fewer than 10 cars per 1,000 population. While the market for automobiles in the developed countries will continue, the major
growth will occur in the developing countries." 
5 See Hart and Dymond (2008) and Hodgson (2008) for more complete discussions of these new production patterns and their implications for
the design and implementation of trade and industrial policies as well as administration of the border.Commentary 286 | 5
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Trade agreements thus seek to reduce government
ability to use micro-economic instruments that
discriminate in favour of local producers and
influence the operation of markets. 
Trade agreements have made steady progress in
eliminating or minimizing many of the tools in the
government economic toolbox to the point that it is
now virtually impossible for most governments to
shape the structures of their economies. Markets
have become the principal determinants of who
makes what, for whom and where (Hart and
Dymond 2008, Hodgson 2008). 
Some analysts have wrongly characterized this
process as deregulation. What has changed is the
focus of government intervention. Indeed, the past
50 years of OECD government regulatory activity
has seen a major shift away from a focus on
economic outcomes to a preoccupation with
quality-of-life issues. The result has been a
significant increase in the regulatory reach of
government. As American public policy expert
James Q. Wilson points out: “When Dwight
Eisenhower [1953-1961] was president, hardly
anybody thought that Washington should make
policies about crime, guns, education, abortion,
medical care (except for veterans), the environment,
automobile safety, local advertising, the econo-
mically disadvantaged or minorities’ access to jobs
and schooling. Today, people assume that
Washington will have policies on all these matters
and more” (Wilson 2003, 528). 
The same holds true for Canada. Today, both the
Canadian and US federal governments promulgate
more than 4,000 new or amended regulations every
year, most of them focused on risk and quality-of-
life issues from the environment to food safety
(Jones and Graf 2001; Crews 2004).
The automotive industry provides a perfect
illustration of this change in focus. At the time of
the Auto Pact, Canadian and US federal, state and
provincial governments regulated neither the
vehicles produced nor the manner in which they
were produced.6 European governments began
regulating automotive products in 1958, but US
and Canadian governments did not follow suit until
a decade later. 
The European approach was geared from the
outset to the establishment of internationally
recognized regulatory norms. Neither Canada nor
the United States, however, adopted that approach.
Today, both governments maintain extensive
industry-specific regulatory regimes governing
safety, fuel consumption and environmental im-
pacts. 
Unfortunately, despite the determination to create
an integrated industry in 1964, Ottawa and
Washington have seen limited utility in integrating
their regulatory approaches with each other or more
broadly. While regulatory regimes in both countries
have evolved to meet virtually identical goals, their
approaches have diverged. 
The steady expansion of risk-oriented regulations
has been a principal catalyst in the increasing
sophistication of modern passenger vehicles. In
addition, greater consumer awareness of, and
demand for, safer, more fuel-efficient and less-
polluting cars has spurred the industry to offer
vehicles that go beyond government-mandated
requirements. As a result, cars built today are
significantly safer, more fuel-efficient and less
polluting than those of earlier years. 
Additionally, consumers have been prepared to
pay a premium for an increasing range of amenities
and performance characteristics, from air
conditioning and all-wheel drives to high-end audio
equipment and GPS navigation systems.
Competition, including from off-shore, has ensured
that the cost of building these more complex,
higher-performing, longer-lasting and more
satisfying vehicles has remained at competitive
levels. 
Differences in regulatory approaches challenge
manufacturers to design vehicles that satisfy both
regulatory requirements and consumer preferences
in different markets. Regulatory divergence
discourages global approaches and inhibits the use
6 The only extant regulation was a US rule dating back to 1940 requiring use of sealed-beam headlights in automobiles. Ralph Nader's 1965
Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile is widely recognized as the principal catalyst to Congressional hearings
in 1965/1966 and the subsequent adoption of safety legislation, laying the foundation for today's extensive regulatory regimes in both
countries. | 6 Commentary 286
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of cost-effective, interchangeable parts and designs.
As in other industries with high levels of regulation,
the dividing line between social objectives and
protectionism in pursuing regulatory goals can be a
thin one. Convergence in national regulatory
approaches, on the other hand, can facilitate
adjustment to more globalized markets. Broader ac-
ceptance of best practices in both manufacturing
and regulation can contribute to the development of
better vehicles and reduce socially undesirable
impacts. 
Three principal, industry-specific regulatory
regimes are now critical to the design and
production of passenger vehicles and light trucks in
Canada and the United States: safety regulations,
fuel consumption targets and pollution abatement
goals. Growing public concern with anthropogenic
climate change has added greenhouse-gas-emission
targets to public demands to improve fuel
consumption and reduce engine emissions. 
None of these regimes existed in 1965. Each was
introduced in response to emerging societal interest
in health and safety risks as well as quality-of-life
concerns. For each regime, the US Congress was,
and remains, instrumental in establishing
benchmarks, and American regulatory officials are
critical to translating them into specific rules and
standards. Today, the US federal government
maintains extensive rules governing safety, fuel
consumption and engine-emission standards that
must be met by all US-based manufacturers and, to
a lesser extent, all imported vehicles. The Canadian
regime generally tracks, but is not wholly
compatible with, the US system. 
The US Regime
Congress set up the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) in the Department of
Transportation (DOT) in 1967 to establish and
monitor “motor vehicle safety standards and
regulations” to which manufacturers of motor
vehicles and equipment must certify compliance.
NHTSA standards target minimum performance
requirements for motor vehicles and equipment
with a view to reducing risks arising from defects in
the design, construction or performance of motor
vehicles. 
Since 1967, the NHTSA has issued dozens of
required standards in response to expanding public
concerns about automotive safety. Standards are
performance-based and rely on self-certification by
the manufacturer, supplemented by compliance
investigations and court orders flowing from
litigation by both individuals and interest groups.7
In response to the quadrupling of oil prices in
1973, the NHTSA established “fuel economy”
standards in 1977 in an effort to increase the
performance of passenger vehicles and light trucks.
Over the years, the NHTSA has set progressively
more stringent minimum average fuel economy
levels. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards require vehicle manufacturers to comply
with the gas mileage standards set by the DOT.
Under current rules, US manufacturers must reach a
fleet average of 35 miles per US gallon by the 2020
model year. CAFE values are obtained using city
and highway fuel economy test results and a
weighted average of vehicle sales.
In 1990, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to
define federal “emissions standards” that took full
effect for the 1996 model year. Congress subse-
quently tightened the standards to take effect over a
phase-in period covering model years 2004 to 2007
for cars and light-duty trucks. In every successive
model year within this period, an additional 25
percent of an automaker’s fleet had to comply with
the new standard.
Every passenger car and light-duty truck sold in
the United States must also comply with emissions
regulations established by the EPA under the Clean
Air Act. In addition to the federal standards enforced
by the EPA, the Clean Air Act provides that
California can implement its own, more stringent
emissions standards and that other states may adopt
California’s standards at their discretion. By the
beginning of 2009, up to 11 states were considering
adopting this option.
7 See the NHTSA website for more detail at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov. The agency became an independent organization in 1975.Commentary 286 | 7
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
The Canadian Regime
Canadian officials have generally followed the trend
line for regulations set in the United States, but have
adapted them to Canadian circumstances. Canadian
legislative and regulatory approaches, for example,
tend to be more flexible than those in the United
States. The separation of powers in the United
States, with Congress establishing broad legislative
standards, the executive branch translating these
into very specific rules and regulations and the
courts enforcing the results, leads to greater rigidity
and specificity than is the case in Canada.8
In Canada, “product standards” are defined by the
federal government and in-use requirements by the
provinces. Transport Canada is the principal
regulator of automobile safety issues under the 1970
Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA). As in the United
States, Canada relies on a self-certification system,
requiring vehicle and parts manufacturers to certify
that their products comply with all applicable
requirements. 
Transport Canada officials, however, are more
prone to conduct compliance investigations and to
second guess the engineering judgment of the
manufacturers, a bone of contention within the
industry (CAPC 2005). National trademarks and
labels are used to indicate that a vehicle complies
with the MVSA. 
Today, no one can ship a vehicle from one
province to another or import vehicles or equipment
into Canada without certifying that it conforms to
the standards prescribed for its class. Vehicles may be
imported into Canada from: 1) anywhere by
manufacturers or dealers who are able to certify that
they comply with all applicable regulations, or 2)
the United States by individuals or dealers who
must then seek proof of compliance from a
competent agent before registering the vehicle in the
relevant province.9
Transport Canada also sets “fuel economy
standards” under the voluntary federal Motor
Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards (MVFCS)
program inaugurated in 1978. It provides
information on fuel consumption rates to
prospective vehicle buyers. Under the program,
manufacturers commit to meet a progressively more
stringent annual Company Average Fuel
Consumption (CAFC) standard for new
automobiles sold in Canada. 
The CAFC standards in Canada are modelled on
the mandatory US CAFE regulations, but remain
voluntary at this time. The government believes that
approximately 98 percent of all vehicles sold in
Canada meet these standards; the remaining 2
percent are built by limited-line manufacturers of
luxury, high-performance or special-use vehicles. At
the beginning of 2008, however, then- transport
minister Lawrence Cannon announced that the
government would develop mandatory standards for
the 2011 model year, with a view to achieving the
US target of 35 miles per US gallon as the new fleet
goal by 2020. In a burst of national pride, the
minister welcomed the US goal, but insisted that
Canada is “committed to developing made-in-
Canada standards that achieve – at minimum – that
same target in Canada (Transport Canada 2008).”
Canada introduced “national emissions
regulations” to provide health and environmental
protection in 1971. These standards cover crankcase
emissions, exhaust emissions of carbon monoxide,
hydrocarbons, oxides of nitrogen, diesel particulate
matters, evaporative hydrocarbon emissions and
smoke opacity. 
Originally administered by Transport Canada
under the auspices of the MVSA, emission
standards have since 1999 been the responsibility 
of Environment Canada under the terms of the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) 
and the On-Road Vehicle and Engine Emission
8 Parliament, for example, passed legislation in 1981 – the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act – providing the government with the
authority to establish fuel-consumption standards. For the next 26 years, however, no government saw a need to proclaim this legislation and
follow up with more detailed regulations, relying on voluntary compliance and free riding on the US standards. That changed on November
2, 2007, when the Harper government, as part of its climate change strategy, decided to proclaim the Act and begin the process of developing
mandatory regulations (Transport Canada 2008).
9 Individual consumers importing cars from the United States in late 2007 and early 2008 to take advantage of the strong Canadian dollar and
Canada/US price differentials experienced some of these problems, particularly as regards the Canadian requirement to add theft
immobilizers to some US models (Chase and Keenan 2007).| 8 Commentary 286
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Regulations promulgated in 2002. These regulations
apply to new vehicles imported into Canada or
shipped from one province or territory to another,
as well as to used vehicles imported into Canada.
Since 1997, Canadian emissions standards track
those established by the EPA in the United States.
Regulatory Cooperation
In order for manufacturers to build a vehicle for
more than one market, it must be tested to multiple
standards. This increases vehicle development cost
and, in some cases, can and does result in limiting
the choice of vehicles for consumers, particularly
when projected sales volumes do not justify the
additional engineering and testing resources to
satisfy the unique requirements of a smaller market
like Canada. 
Differences in philosophy can further complicate
efforts to reduce the negative economic effects of
regulatory divergence. Canada and the United
States, for example, have developed unique
performance-based standards while the rest of the
world relies on type-approval rules pioneered in
Europe and codified by the UN’s Economic Com-
mission for Europe (ECE). 
Despite the close ties and common automotive
interests between Canada and the United States,
there is no formal program to ensure that regulatory
developments in either country are pursued on a
cooperative or coordinated basis with a view to
minimizing or eliminating minor differences.
Officials in both countries remain free to regulate
without reference to the rules in place or
contemplated in the other. Nevertheless, they do
work together as a matter of habit and common
interest. A NAFTA automotive committee, for
example, provides a basis for exchanging informa-
tion and discussing regulatory developments. The
UN’s World Forum on Vehicle Regulation10 and
the APEC Automotive Dialogue11 both provide
further opportunities for consultation between
industry and government officials, suggesting that
there is an appetite among governments to reduce
regulatory differences where possible.12
Canada and the United States are also both
signatories to the 1998 Parallel Global Agreement
developed by the ECE. This agreement promotes
the development of global technical regulations
addressing safety, energy efficiency and
environmental protection (Industry Canada 2007a).
While the long-term goal of global regulatory
convergence may be desirable, the more immediate
challenge is to address the Canada-US divergence. 
Experience outside of North America suggests
that coordinated approaches to regulation pose no
serious obstacle to stated public policy goals. Prior
to 1965, highway death and injury levels were
sufficiently high to warrant government
intervention in all jurisdictions. Canada and the
United States took one direction and gradually
developed very stringent performance-based
requirements. Europe and the rest of the world
relied on the already established ECE type-approval
regime. Looking back over 40 years, it is not
possible to conclude that one approach or the other
has led to superior results.13
There is no evidence that cooperation and
harmonization have compromised effective
regulation in Europe. However, evidence on the
10 The World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations is a Working Party of the UN's Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Its
mandate flows from a 1958 "Agreement concerning the adoption of uniform technical prescriptions for wheeled vehicles, equipment and parts
which can be fitted and/or be used on wheeled vehicles and the conditions for reciprocal recognition of approvals granted on the basis of these
prescriptions." Participating countries agree to a common set of ECE Regulations for type approval of vehicles and components. When an item is
type-approved for a regulation by one participating country, then the approval is accepted by all other participating countries. Some 52 countries
adhere to the ECE's regulatory framework. Canada and the United States do not. 
11 The APEC Automotive Dialogue was set up in 1999 to provide a public-private forum devoted to trade facilitation, standards and regulatory
harmonization, as well as economic and technical cooperation in the industry. Nine meetings have been held to date, the latest in Melbourne,
Australia (April 17-20, 2007). More at http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/committee_on_trade/ automotive_dialogue.html. 
12 In their overview of the extensive informal networks among Canadian and US officials, Mouafo, Morales and Heynen devote 10 pages (145-154)
to the extensive links between US and Canadian officials in the transportation area. 
13 Traffic safety expert Leonard Evans reports, for example, that in 2001 fatalities per 1,000 vehicles ranged from a low of 0.102 in Norway to a high
of 0.235 in France among OECD countries, with the United States at 0.190 and Canada at 0.153. Fatality and injury rates in OECD countries
have greatly declined over the past 40 years, but more rapidly in Europe than in North America, albeit from a higher base (Evans 2004, 43). Commentary 286 | 9
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14 From airport security to pesticide regulations, government officials and their political masters have saddled the world with an increasing array
of rules that shield ministers, cabinet secretaries and their officials from criticism by the modern army of "activists." Once in place, such rules
are difficult to repeal or reform. The work of analysts influenced by the public-choice theories of Gordon Tullock and the law-and-economics
theories of Richard Posner has been particularly important in pointing to the problems of self-serving regulatory behaviour by ministers,
cabinet secretaries, their officials, activists and industry clients, each of whom can frustrate reform of over-zealous regulatory regimes. 
impact of differential regulations governing fuel
consumption and emissions is more difficult to
measure. The European approach of high fuel taxes
has conditioned consumers to prefer smaller, more
fuel-efficient vehicles, while concerns about
pollution are politically potent in all advanced
economies. The average fuel economy and
environmental impact of passenger vehicles sold in
Europe, Japan and Australia are comparable to those
sold in North America, indicating that different
regulatory approaches can result in similar
outcomes. 
The differences in approach between North
American jurisdictions of Canada and the United
States, on the one hand and the rest of the world, on
the other, are extensive and make it difficult to move
toward global regulatory convergence. But the
differences between Canada and the United States,
themselves, are marginal and can only be explained
on two grounds: the rent-seeking behaviour of
officials and the risk-averting concerns of ministers. 
Once a regulatory regime is in place, officials will
fight hard to maintain or even enlarge it, aware that
their jobs and careers depend on it. Ministers, on
the other hand are reluctant to reduce, change or
eliminate regulations that serve, at best, marginal
public policy purposes for fear that they will be
criticized for failing to ensure the welfare or safety of
their constituents. Both ministers and officials,
aided by the media, are quick to point to market
failures, but rarely accept the more widespread
problem of government failure. 
Well documented in the literature, rent-seeking
and risk-averting behaviour are notoriously difficult
to overcome once regulations are entrenched in law
and practice.14The task of reducing national
differences in regulatory details frequently conforms
to this phenomenon. Nevertheless, the task is not
impossible: after all, the two countries seek virtually
identical goals in their regulatory efforts. 
Additionally, as indicated above, the story of the
past 70 years of trade negotiations has been one of
using international disciplines to overcome exactly
these two obstacles to better public policy. A further
incentive to reform is that regulatory convergence




Cross-border integration of the auto industry has
progressed significantly since 1965. The emergence
of inconsistent regulations in the two countries, on
the other hand, has led to inefficiencies and
increased costs. 
The automotive industry, like most other large
businesses, conducts its planning and business
development in a global environment in order to
remain competitive. While efforts are made by
Canadian regulatory departments to consider North
American market realities, regulatory policy
generally continues to be made on the basis of
domestic priorities, as opposed to an approach more
consistent with today’s globalized market realities. In
addition to divergence in standards, differences also
exist between Canadian and American authorities
with respect to how vehicle certification is
undertaken to show compliance with those
standards. 
Cross-Border Regulatory Divergence Matters
The Canadian and US markets for vehicles are, for
all practical purposes, a single market, with largely
similar driving conditions, a wide range of climatic
conditions and broadly shared regulatory goals and
approaches. Bilateral coordination of product
regulations, therefore, makes business sense and
represents good public policy. 
Like the industry itself, regulatory regimes on
both sides of the border are mature, having
developed over four decades. They are also highly
technical in nature with Canadian and US officials
historically sharing information and experience. As| 10 Commentary 286
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well, many improvements in both safety technology
and emissions controls have been voluntarily
introduced through understandings reached with
manufacturers. All these processes have been useful
in bringing issues of common concern forward in an
attempt to simplify the regulatory burden, but they
have not always been successful. As a result,
unnecessary and burdensome regulatory differences
exist and continue to emerge.
Due to the relatively small size of the 
Canadian market, combined with the massive
costs associated with the design, development and
manufacture of new vehicles, producing vehicles
that conform to unique-to-Canada standards is
unrealistic. Such standards would increase the cost
of a new vehicle or limit choice for Canadian
consumers, undoing many of the benefits of the
Auto Pact. In effect, North American assemblers
design, engineer and build vehicles to conform to
US standards and then retrofit or adapt vehicles
destined for Canadian consumption to Canadian
standards. 
Increased costs to consumers resulting from
unique-to-Canada standards usually decreases the
rate of the vehicle fleet turnover, thus limiting the
benefit of technological improvements. Special
Canadian standards can also limit vehicle
production opportunities. If a vehicle cannot be sold
in a marketplace, it typically will not be produced in
that jurisdiction. Historically, Canadian consumers
have been more cost-conscious than their American
counterparts, in part due to lower disposable
incomes, and are thus less willing to absorb cost
increases driven by unique regulatory requirements. 
Over the past few years, regulatory officials in
Canada have succeeded in increasing the number of
fully harmonized North American safety standards
for cars and light trucks from 15 to 24, out of a total
of 50. Work continues on harmonizing others, but
at least seven unique standards significantly
differentiate Canadian passenger vehicles from those
produced for the US market (See Box 1). The
progress to date is the result of Canadian
government officials using the discretion at their
disposal to reduce minor regulatory differences. 
There is no basis in Canadian – or US – law or
regulation, however, to require regulatory officials to
reduce or eliminate remaining differences or, more
importantly, to ensure that new differences do not
emerge. There are no formal provisions, for ex-
ample, to require that any new or amended
regulation in either country meets a compatibility
Canadian safety policy has a structure consistent
with US policy. However, differences between the
two nations’ safety standards do exist, with
additional exceptions being contemplated. Some of
the more prominent differences include:
￿ Transport Canada does not accept manufacturers’
use of engineering judgment and electronic
simulation in the certification of vehicles. Such
acceptance would facilitate the introduction of
advanced safety technologies in a more rapid and
efficient manner, providing Canadians access to
the best available safety technology sooner than
would otherwise be possible. 
￿ Transport Canada is considering changes in the
front-occupant protection rules that would differ
significantly from the belt/airbag requirements
that have been adopted in the United States.
￿ Canadian standards for electronic immobilizers
to reduce theft and joy-riding differ substantively
from anti-theft requirements in the United
States.
￿ Canada requires day-time running headlights;
the United States does not.
￿ Canadian metric and bilingual standards require
unique speedometer/odometer clusters and ISO
symbols.
￿ Canada has proposed tracking US fuel and
emission requirements for vehicles, but has not
followed suit by ensuring that Canadian fuel
quality standards are compatible with these
requirements.
Box 1: Differences that MatterCommentary 286 | 11
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test. There is no challenge function requiring
officials to justify a regulatory difference. And there
remains a mindset among some officials at both the
federal and provincial level that places a political
value on the concept of “made-in-Canada”
regulations. 
The Need for Mandatory Coordination
Mechanisms
In a 2002 discussion paper, Transport Canada
argued that it had built an adaptive capacity into
many of its safety regulations to meet changes in US
requirements. The paper further proposed
amending certain Canadian regulations so that
certification that a product met US requirements
would be sufficient for Canadian standards. In prac-
tical terms, however, officials’ ability to act in this
way has been compromised by broader legislative
and regulatory requirements. Proposals to correct
these problems were advanced in the paper, but
there has been no systematic follow-up (Transport
Canada 2002).
There is a compelling need for a mandatory,
coordinated regulatory approach by Canada and the
United States to review differing automotive
regulations. The goal should be to make US and
Canadian regulations consistent and create a
product standard environment that respects a single
set of North American, self-certification regulatory
requirements. 
Perhaps most importantly, the two governments
need to recognize the highly integrated nature of
North American automobile production. To that
end, Washington and Ottawa should put in place
mandatory coordination mechanisms to ensure that
regulations are developed and implemented so as to
avoid unwarranted differences in standards and
regulatory requirements. Eliminating regulatory
differences would also have an important effect on
reducing the impact of border administration and
facilitating continued integration of Canadian
production into that of North America as a whole. 
The Continuing Role of the Border
The auto industry is the largest industrial user of
border services and the mainstay of cargo
movements at the three busiest border crossings
joining Ontario and Michigan (Windsor-Detroit
Tunnel, Ambassador Bridge and Blue Water
Bridge). Regulatory convergence would help the
industry by significantly reducing border
administration requirements. It would also have
wide cost-saving implications, important both for
the industry in its efforts to compete with global
competitors, and for consumers. 
The cross-border integration of the industry over
the past 45 years has made it deeply dependent on
an efficient, well-functioning border administration.
Within the integrated auto industry, many parts
cross the border multiple times as they are
transformed or incorporated into larger assemblies
that ultimately make up finished vehicles. More
than one-third of the 36,000 transport trucks that
cross the border every day are loaded with parts, cars
and materials used by the auto industry. Any
breakdown or even slowdown in border
administration can jeopardize the operations of
entire assembly plants and incur high costs.15
15 Pierre Martin concludes, "although the total costs are difficult to estimate with precision, they are significant and likely to become higher"
(Martin 2006:15). Perrin Beatty, when president of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association, claimed that "border delays alone
cost the Canadian and US economies an estimated $12.5 billion annually. In the automotive industry alone, it is estimated that the additional
reporting, compliance and delay costs translate into an estimated $800 per vehicle" (Beatty 2005). John Taylor and his colleagues have made
the most detailed study of Canada-US border costs and estimate that direct costs add between US$7.52 billion and US$13.2 billion annually
to cross-border trade (Taylor and Robideaux 2003). Indirect costs are even more difficult to estimate. Automotive industry analysts estimate
that "a lost hour of assembly output due to a parts shortage costs approximately US$60,000 per hour in lost earnings" (Andrea and Smith
2002, 19). The impact that a more open border would have on either direct or indirect costs is equally difficult to estimate. Experience in the
EU, however, suggests that the move toward a more open border – the so-called Schengen Agreement – both boosted commerce and reduced
direct and indirect costs without any significant negative impact on security and regulatory objectives (Egan 2001).| 12 Commentary 286
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Customs Administration and the Border
Zealous border administration is a product of the
modern welfare state and the historic ease of travel.
Customs administration was haphazard until the
20th century, and immigration controls were almost
non-existent. As settler societies, Canadian and US
officials were more interested in attracting migrants
than in controlling them until well into the 20th
century. With the gradual disappearance of the
traditional customs responsibility for collecting
revenue, the focus has shifted to ensuring
compliance with regulatory requirements and
addressing security and immigration concerns.16
One study estimates that Canadian border
officials are responsible for ensuring compliance
with nearly 100 statutory instruments on behalf of
several dozen federal departments and agencies. On
the US side of the border, officials verify compliance
with some 400 statutory instruments (Hart and
Noble 2003). In most instances, domestic
commerce in both countries must be equally
compliant. In these circumstances, customs
administration at the border serves largely as a
bureaucratic convenience. 
Both governments seek the rapid movement of
legitimate travellers and efficient clearance of freight.
Both seek the interdiction of terrorists, illegal drugs,
smuggling, illegal migrants, money laundering and
other criminal activities. These goals are broadly
shared by the two governments; the differences are
matters of detail and emphasis. 
The clearance of a truckload of goods through
Canadian or US customs, for example, requires that
officials are satisfied that the goods, the truck and
the driver are all eligible for entry. Eligibility of the
goods may involve considerations related to cus-
toms (tariffs, rules of origin and similar issues),
health, safety, environment, labelling, government
procurement, trade remedies, taxes, environmental
concerns and more. The truck must be certified to
meet safety and similar requirements. 
At the same time, the driver must satisfy
immigration requirements regarding citizenship,
visas, criminal records, professional certification,
labour regulations and similar matters. In each case,
Canadian and US laws seek to safeguard security,
health, safety and other important public policy
goals. 
Rather than facilitating an integrated Canada-US
market, border administration ensures the conti-
nuance of two markets that remain hostage to the
efficiency and reliability of customs clearance, an
issue of greater importance to Canadian-based than
US-based firms. The logic of the market dictates that
new or expanded production facilities locate in the
larger market and export as desirable to the smaller
market. Canadian policy for the past 70 years has
been geared to reducing the impact of this logic.
Since 9/11, however, both governments have
taken steps to make the bilateral border more secure,
a laudable motive, but one that has had considerable
unintended consequences as the border has
thickened. In real terms, Canada-US trade peaked
in 2000 and has been relatively stagnant since then,
a development not unrelated to more zealous border
administration (Grady 2008a and Globerman and
Storer 2008).
The Limits of Recent Reform Initiatives
Insufficient investment in infrastructure to keep
pace with the tripling in bilateral trade volumes
since the mid-1980s has added pressure to the
smooth operation of border crossings. In
recognition of the extent of their shared objectives,
Canadian and US officials over the course of the
1990s initiated a series of bilateral programs and
dialogues aimed at finding ways to make the two
borders more open, effective and efficient. At the
Canada-US border, such programs as CANPASS,
FAST and INSPASS seek to facilitate travel by
frequent, low-risk users. 
16 A 2005 Canadian Automotive Partnership Council analysis concluded that "despite the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
the US and the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in Canada, at least 44 agencies between our countries have some level
of jurisdiction over our shared border. These include transportation agencies, food inspectors, immigration agents, police and security forces,
environmental agencies and consumer protection agencies, all of whom have a role in regulating who and what comes into or out of each of
our countries. Since September 11, 2001, these agencies and departments have been examining their mandates and determining if their
regulations are strong enough to avoid any and all possible future security threats. Generally, this has been done in a 'stovepipe' fashion
without looking across the board to other government departments and programs for coordinated solutions." Commentary 286 | 13
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Most Canadian-based vehicle manufacturers, for
example, are fully approved in the US Free and
Secure Trade (FAST) program, with more than 80
percent of their cross-border shipments processed
using this program (CAPC 2005). Unfortunately, as
the auto and other industries have learned, the cost
of complying with these programs is out of all
proportion to the benefits. And in many cases, they
make only a small difference to the border clearance
process. 
These programs may reflect best practices, but
rarely translate into the trust that should be
accorded to the best corporate citizens on both sides
of the border (George 2008). Companies
participating in these programs, for example, are still
subject to the same inspection fees as non-
participating shippers. Other initiatives – from the
Shared Border Accord announced in 1995 to the
Security and Prosperity Partnership formed in 2005
– try to make better use of emerging technologies,
find ways to streamline implementation of border
policies, share information and coordinate activities
and otherwise make existing laws and policies work
more effectively. 
These initiatives, however, have been limited by
the decision to work within the confines of existing
legislative mandates, by the lack of an intellectually
coherent, strategic framework, by the limited
benefits extended to corporate users and by onerous
new requirements. They have also been complicated
by the new security reality ushered in by 9/11. The
auto industry estimates that processing time
entering the United States from Canada had tripled
from 45 seconds per truck in 2000 to more than
135 seconds by the end of 2004, creating
inefficiencies and adding expenses to maintaining
the integrated market. 
More disturbing is the requirement that shippers
supply documents to customs officials electronically
and wait well away from the border until they have
been “cleared” to move. In such circumstances, a
processing time of 45 seconds or 135 seconds at the
border is immaterial compared to the many hours
spent waiting at a truck stop for permission to
proceed to the border. In other words, electronic
documentation and processing may be slowing,
rather than facilitating, customs clearance
procedures. 
Creating a coherent framework, investing in
infrastructure and in technology (both at ports-of-
entry and at the corridors leading to such ports) and
targetting resources toward pre-clearance programs
for goods, vehicles and people are, therefore, critical
components of any comprehensive effort at
improving the management of the border and
reducing its negative commercial impact. Good
corporate citizens on both sides of the border should
be able to count on a level of trust from both
governments in the implementation and
administration of various border programs. For the
automotive industry in particular, the objective
should be to create a border that is considerably
more open and less bureaucratic within a North
America that is more secure (Grady 2008b).
Need to Distinguish Between Customs and
Security Requirements
In considering ways to address the negative
economic impact of border administration and
remaining trade barriers, it is useful to distinguish
between the efforts to ensure compliance with a host
of regulatory requirements and those to enforce laws
and other matters that fall within the ambit of
police and security considerations. Most of the
requirements administered at the border involve
regulatory matters and are secondary to the primary
objective of maintaining a secure border. A key
aspect of any effort to ensure the more efficient and
effective operation of the border, therefore, involves
identifying those aspects of the border-clearance
process that could be satisfied by other procedures
away from the border or eliminated altogether. 
Much of the customs clearance of goods, for
example, involves onerous information and
reporting requirements that can be satisfied on a
basis similar to normal domestic reporting
requirements for firms in both economies. Much of
this reporting operates as if the two economies are
not joined by a free-trade area. 
Additionally, most customs requirements – for
example, origin certificates – involve matters that
can easily be eliminated by harmonizing most-
favoured-nation tariff levels and similar steps. For
the automotive industry, this requirement was
largely met more than 40 years ago. A well-designed17 The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, in cooperation with the US Chamber, released a detailed study in 2008 outlining both the
shortcomings of existing programs and the scope for improvement (Chamber 2008). 
18 To be frank, much of the post 9/11 thickening of the border is similar in concept and design to airport security: heavily geared to providing
comfort to politicians eager to be seen to be "doing something," but creating extensive inconvenience to legitimate travellers and border
crossers and only slight inconvenience to illegitimate ones. 
19 The US has already added considerably to its border resources. The number of agents at the Canada-US border increased from 340 in 2001 to
1,128 in May 2008 and is scheduled to rise further to 1,845 by the end of October 2009 (US CBP, 2008). The Canadian Border Services
Agency has also added to its resources and strengthened its mandate. Canadian customs agents, for example, are now armed. 
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initiative to identify those remaining aspects of
border administration that can either be eliminated
or addressed away from the border would contribute
importantly to making the border function more
efficiently, less intrusively and at lower cost to both
government and industry.17
Similarly, virtually all travel across the border
involves properly documented and eligible
individuals pursuing legitimate objectives, from
business to tourism. Much of the activity of
immigration officers at the Canada-US border,
therefore, is routine and makes little contribution 
to safety and security. Attempts to cross the border
by those who pose potential threats are rare and
isolated, particularly relative to the half a million
people who cross it every day. 
Every port-of-entry, of course, is vulnerable to
penetration by undesirable elements, but experience
indicates that those with serious criminal intent have
ample space – and resources – to bypass port-of-
entry controls without much effort. Current border
administration places a heavy burden on law-
abiding corporations and individuals without
necessarily impeding criminal, terrorist or other
undesirable elements.18 Again, a well-designed
initiative aimed at identifying how these routine
requirements can either be eliminated, be performed
away from the border, or be satisfied by relying on
more modern technologies would pay handsome
dividends in creating a more efficient, effective and
secure border and, as a result, a better functioning
North American economy. The solution to any real
threat lies in devoting more attention and resources
to intelligence gathering, information sharing, and
entry by individuals and goods from non-Canadian
and non-US points of origin, rather than to
increasing routine inspections at the shared border. 
Policy Implications
Increasing resources at the border seems unlikely to
achieve additional results, absent extraordinary
further investments in human and physical
infrastructure.19 Such investments, moreover, could
result in considerable collateral damage to economic
interests in an effort to find solutions to a problem
that can be handled more effectively and efficiently
by other means. Rather, the two governments need
to work with each other at every level, institutionali-
zing contacts, enhancing cooperation and sharing
information on matters small and large. They
should make much greater investments in intelli-
gence gathering and gradually focus ever-larger parts
of that effort at initial entries into North America. 
They should also make far greater investments in
infrastructure and in technology. Both types of
investments are critical components of any
comprehensive effort to improve the management
of the border. Such investments should not proceed
on the basis of current inspection methodologies,
but rely much more on risk assessments and random
inspections. They should also focus more on
targetting resources toward pre-clearance programs
for goods, vehicles and people. Finally, the two
governments need to engage in discussions about
increasing the level of convergence in policies
governing such matters as cargo and passenger pre-
clearance programs, law-enforcement programs of
all types, as well as immigration and refugee
determination procedures.Commentary 286 | 15
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Conclusions
The automotive industry has benefitted enormously
from the 1964 Canada-US decision to pursue trade
and industrial policies that gave it the incentive to
integrate. Integration, in turn, has allowed suppliers,
workers and customers alike to reap the benefits of
specialization and economies of scale. Regulatory
developments in the two countries, on the other
hand, while generally consistent in philosophy and
approach, have not kept up with the reality of
integrated production. When combined with the
thickening of the border after 9/11, the result has
been to reintroduce barriers to full Canadian
participation in the industry.
The industry’s vision, shared widely among its
members, is “one product, certified once for sale
across one market.” Its reports and submissions to
government never fail to include a call for greater
attention to the restricting effect of border
administration and regulatory differences. New
Canadian government programs and initiatives, on
the other hand, while full of stirring words about
the importance of the industry and its role as the
jewel in Canada’s trading crown, studiously avoid
any mention of efforts to address the continuing
impact of overly zealous border administration and
rent-seeking regulatory behaviour. 
As the discussion in this Commentary has made
plain, this situation is not sustainable. The Canadian
market alone is far from sufficient to justify unique
regulatory requirements, particularly those that serve
no discernible public policy purpose. 
David Emerson, while Canada’s minister of
international trade, told The Globe and Mail that
the United States must stop the creeping thickening
of border controls. Emerson said: 
“I think the threat is that we will just continue
this bottom-up accumulation of little, border-
impeding, border-thickening, initiatives. [It’s]
been disheartening for some years now, the degree
to which protectionist forces in the US and now
some of the rigid mindsets of the security
establishment are really starting to, I think,
threaten the special relationship that used to be
there.” (Chase 2007.) 
Emerson was right. Unfortunately, he failed to
convince his colleagues that the time had come to
take a much more pragmatic approach to the
impact on Canadian trade and economic interests of
well-intentioned but dysfunctional government
decisions – Canadian and American – that maintain
or even increase regulatory differences and border
congestion. The auto industry would be a good
place to reverse that mindset and introduce a
coherent program aimed at erasing the border as a
factor in restraining Canadian trade and economic
development. After all, it was the Auto Pact that
started Canada on the road toward a more open and
realistic Canada-US economic relationship. It would
be fitting if, once again, the industry blazed a trail
toward a more sustainable approach to regulations
and the border. 
The automotive industry in North America 
faces tough challenges, from product development
to financial woes. Both the US and Canadian
governments have responded to the pleas from the
industry to help it through its current difficulties.
One way to do that is to reduce the cost of
regulatory divergence, a reform that will impose no
burden on taxpayers. Similarly, a better performing
border will facilitate the industry’s ability to make
the best use of resources in the two countries, again
at little or no cost to the public. Given the billions
that governments are prepared to spend to help the
industry, taxpayers may wish to hear that less costly
reforms are also being implemented to strengthen
the industry’s long-term viability. | 16 Commentary 286
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